I. Introduction Consider a club whose members might undertake a joint public project. According to the club's majority rule, the project can only be undertaken if approved by a fraction m of the mem bers. A member's valuation ofthe project depends on how much she has invested in advance. How are the incentives to invest related to the majority rule? Which rule should the club select in order to encourage optimal investments? While this problem is quite general, it might be best moti vated by the European Union. The EU applies different majority rules to different political issues: while international treaties require unanimity, policies on the common market are made according to "qualified majority rules," and a simple majority is sufficient for implementation. Moreover, the EU has changed its voting rules several times during its history. the way the EU makes collective decisions. Several issues that required unanimity in the past, may soon be made by a qualified majority (examples are policies related to security, justice, immi gration, and external relations). Moreover, the definition of a "qualified majority" is supposed to decrease from 72 to 65 percent. Whether the member countries end up ratifying or renegotiating the Constitution, the debate raises the questions of why different majority rules are necessary, and what are the optimal rules. To answer these questions, we must understand how major ity rules affect economic policies. A typical project in the EU is to liberalize the common market. Quite soon, we might see addi tional directives on the liberalization of public utilities, such as electricity, telecommunications, mail, and transport. While the telecoms market is now quite liberalized, much remains to be done in the electricity market. The obstacles for further liberal ization are domestic: CEPR [1999] criticizes member countries for having different standards, bad market institutions, public own ership, and state aid. To make liberalization in the EU a success, it is crucial that each country pay the cost of modernizing its industry. While this would certainly make a member more com petitive, the member also risks being held up by other members who are less prepared for liberalization, as they might require compensation.
On the other hand, by not preparing at all, a member risks being neglected if a sufficiently large majority prefers to proceed with liberalization nevertheless. What deter mines such strategic concerns, and how do they, and thus the incentives to invest in public projects, depend on the majority rule?
As a framework for studying such problems, this paper pro vides a three-stage model of collective decision-making. Solving the game by backward induction, we can derive the legislative outcome, equilibrium investments, and the optimal majority rule. Since side payments are available, the winners can compensate the losers and the project will be implemented if and only if it is socially efficient ex post?whatever is the majority rule. This resembles the Coase Theorem, and it suggests that the main function of majority rules may not be to select the right projects. To reduce the amount of compensation, however, the majority coalition will consist of members who place a relatively high value on the project. This raises two strategic concerns at the investment stage.
On the negative side, investments reduce bargaining power. The winners of the project become very eager to see it implemented and, in equilibrium, they are expropriated or must compensate those benefiting less. This is a multilateral holdup problem which discourages investment. On the positive side, investments in crease a member's probability of becoming a member of the ma jority coalition of winners. This is valuable, since it is the majority coalition that has the political power to determine the distribu tion of surplus, while the minority is neglected and expropriated. If the majority rule is small, political power is very beneficial, since few losers need to be compensated and a large minority can be expropriated. To improve the chances of becoming a member of the majority coalition, each member invests a lot. If the majority rule is large, political power is less attractive, the holdup problem dominates, and members invest less. The implications of the model are clear: incentives to invest decrease in the majority rule. This generates a status-quo bias if the majority requirement is large?not because it is then hard to make enough members approve?but because underinvestment makes few projects worthwhile to implement. Since incentives also depend on other factors that may influence the value of political power, it is shown that investments increase in the project's value and the club's enforcement capacity but decrease in the ex post heterogeneity in preferences. Moreover, how much a member invests also depends on its size and initial conditions, as these factors influence the chance of gaining political power.
These results imply unambiguous normative recommenda tions. To induce the optimal incentive to invest, the majority rule should balance the concern for bargaining power and the desire to obtain political power. To do this, the majority rule must increase in the project's value and the club's enforcement capacity, but decrease in the heterogeneity. Externalities related to the invest ments can be internalized by adjusting the rule. Thus, the model justifies the practice of using different rules for different issues, and that the rules may evolve over time. Moreover, to induce all members to invest optimally, more votes should be allocated to large members and to members that are initially badly prepared.
The weights should be less than proportional to size, however, and they may be substituted by a double majority rule system. is positive for a mass m of members, and larger than ?r for all.
III. The Basic Results
This section solves the game by backward induction to derive its unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. As a benchmark, observing the first-best outcome is worthwhile. Social efficiency is defined by the sum of utilities, or equivalently, as a member's expected utility. At the legislative stage, executing the project is optimal if and only if the project is "good," meaning that its total value is positive:
(1) vtdi = 8 + x > 0, J i where x denotes average investment.5 Under the optimal selec tion rule (1), the optimal effort level at the investment stage is determined by
where q is the probability that the project turns out to be good ex post. This probability is increasing in x, and is written as fa+a/2 ^e 1 1
if the calculated qix) G [0, 1], which is the most interesting case. The second-order condition is vc"ix*) > 1, which I assume to be fulfilled.
5. For this and similar integrals to be defined, vt is assumed to be piecewise continuous in i.
III.A. Majority Rule Irrelevance
This subsection solves the legislative stage by deriving equi librium taxes, whether the project will be implemented or not, and the coalition formation. To maximize its surplus, any major ity coalition M will ensure that all members of the minority N = I\M receive exactly their reservation utility of ?r. This is achieved by setting the taxes such that ti = vt + r V i G N if the project is proposed, and by setting tt = r V i G N otherwise.
Thus, the majority coalition is taxing a minority member more if ut is large, since i is then more willing to accept the proposal. That a larger value vt leads to a higher tax tt may be interpreted as a loss of bargaining power, and it completely nullifies the positive direct effect on Vs utility: for i G N, ut = uN = ?r, notwith standing vt.
Thus, when transaction costs are negligible, the total reve nue shared by the majority is
if the project is undertaken, and
otherwise. The allocation of this surplus is determined by multi lateral negotiations within the majority coalition. If the negotia tions fail, the status quo remains. Though it might not be obvious how to define the bargaining game with a continuum of players, I let the outcome be characterized by the Nash bargaining solu tion for a finite number of players. Intuitively, a coalition member with a high value vt has corre spondingly low bargaining power, since she is eager to implement the project. Other members are then able to hold up i by requiring side payments to accept the project. As was the case for minority members, majority members lose bargaining power when vt is large, and this negative effect neutralizes the positive direct effect on i's utility: for i G M, ut = uM, notwithstanding vt. Will the majority coalition propose the project? By comparing (3) and (4), they will propose the project if and only if 8 + x > 0, which exactly coincides with the social optimal condition (1). The majority coalition expropriates the minority in any case, and it captures the project's entire value if it is implemented. Thus, the majority will only implement projects raising total welfare. That the selection of projects becomes efficient when transaction costs disappear indicates that the Coase Theorem has bite, even if only a fraction m of the members has political power.
Which coalition members will the initiator select? If the project is good (8 + x ^ 0), any initiator prefers to form the majority coalition with the members having the highest possible values v/s. These "winners" do not need to receive (much) com pensation to approve the project, and they are instead willing to compensate the losers. To some extent, the winners' surplus could be expropriated even if they were excluded from the coalition, but a small part of these tax revenues would disappear as transaction costs. Thus, arbitrarily small transaction costs induce the initia tor to select the winners as coalition members and the identity of 1987] in a slightly different model. If the project is bad (6 + x < 0), however, the project will not be implemented, and the majority's surplus is independent of the composition of the majority coalition. Suppose then that the initiator selects coalition members randomly, giving everyone zero expected utility. Since the members will make the same investment x on day 1 (proved in the next section), their values on day 2 will be uniformly distributed on [6 + xhi2, Q + x + h/2], where the (1 -m) fractile is defined by (5). Let J take the value 1 if the project is undertaken, and 0 otherwise, (ii) follows from the Nash Bargaining Solution, so the initiator's problem can be written as
8. The initiator herself may of course have a low value of the project, since she is randomly drawn from the entire population, but her size is negligible.
(i) and (iii) follow directly, and (iv) follows as uM is larger if for vt > vj9 i G M and j g N, than vice versa (for X > 0 uted with mean 0 + xt and density II h, i realizes that the probability of becoming a majority member increases in her investments:
[ 1 ifm + (xt -x)lh> 1 J der their chances of becoming majority member by not investing at all. Such asymmetric equilibria become important when the members are heterogeneous in subsection IV.C. For now, let us focus on the unique, symmetric equilibrium, which will exist when the shocks (h and cr) are sufficiently large. Proposition 2. Equilibrium investment x is given by (8), and it decreases in the majority rule m and the ex post heteroge neity h, but increases in the club's enforcement capacity r and the project's value a, if m < 1. If m = 1, x ? 0. (8) c'(x) = (a + x + a/2)(a + x + a/2 + 2r)/2/*raa.
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose thatp and q are interior. The first-order condition of (7) becomes
is the probability of a good project if this q(x) G [0, 1], and
is the expected value of a good project. The second-order condition is trivially fulfilled. Suppose that the equilibrium is symmetric, such that (9) can be written as (8). Then, (pp) implies that p is interior. Since both the left-hand side and the right-hand side of (8) increase in x, there may be multiple equilibria.
If the left-hand side increases faster, there is at most one equilibrium, which is stable. This requires that c"(x) > ia + x + a/2 + r)/hvm Vx > 0.
Such an equilibrium (interior for q) exists if the left-hand side of (8) is smaller (larger) than the right-hand side for x = 0 (x subject to qix) = 1), requiring that a > -2a and c'(o72 -a) > (r 4-a/2)/hm.
Since (pp) is nonconcave, there may also be asymmetric equilibria where a fraction 1 -a ofthe j's invest zero because the benefit of investment is just equal to the cost:
which cannot be fulfilled if h > xm (since the probability p of becoming a majority member, following x, is larger than m if a < 1 As Proposition 2 states, investments increase in the enforce ment capacity r. If r is large, then the minority is taxed more, and the revenues shared by the majority are greater. It is then more important to be a member of the majority coalition and the members invest more to increase this probability. Investments will also increase in the project's expected value a. This is partly because a larger a implies that it is more likely that the project becomes good and worthwhile to implement. In addition, a higher valued project makes it more beneficial to be a member of the coalition that shares this value. To increase this probability, investment increases. 
III.C. The Optimal Majority Rule
At the constitutional stage, the members should select the majority rule maximizing their expected utility, recognizing that the majority rule will affect the incentives to invest. To find the optimal majority rule, the equilibrium investment level x (9) should be compared with the socially optimal investment level x* (2). While x* is obviously independent ofthe majority rule m, x is not. As discussed above, a large majority rule m is likely to induce underinvestment since the holdup problem dominates, while a small m may lead to overinvestment since the members are racing for memberships in the majority coalition. These opposing forces are appropriately balanced if the majority rule makes x = x*. Comparing equations (9) and (2) reveals that this requires (10) ra* = (a + x* + 2r + u/2)/2h, if the resulting ra* < l.10
To balance the holdup problem with the incentive to gain political power, the majority rule should be larger in three in stances. First, if the enforcement capacity r is large, the minority is heavily expropriated and it is very attractive to be a majority member sharing these revenues. Second, when the project's value a increases, it is possible to tax the minority more and the larger total surplus shared by the majority coalition makes political power more beneficial. Third, if the heterogeneity h is small, the members' values are closely concentrated. By investing just a little, i increases her probability of becoming a majority member greatly. Any of these changes make gaining political power more attractive or easy and the incentives to invest increase. To pre vent overinvestments, the majority rule should increase.11
10. If the m* defined by (10) is such that ra* > 1, implying that there is overinvestment for any m < 1, the optimal investment level x* is not attainable by a pure (nonrandom) majority rule. The second-best is then either the majority rule m = 1, making x = 0 in equilibrium, or a marginally smaller majority rule which implements the x defined by m = 1 in (9). The latter is better if q(x)v(x) -
If the individual shock e, has a bell-shaped probability density function, however, x approaches zero as m approaches 1. Then ra* G (0, 1) always applies. For this reason, I henceforth assume m* to be interior. 11. The variance in the aggregate shock, cr, has an ambiguous effect on ra*. On the one hand, a increases u given x, thus increasing ra*. On the other hand, q decreases in a if a + x > 0, which in turn decreases jc* and thus ra*. If a is large, the first effect dominates. If a is small, both effects are positive. Also a affects ra* through x*, which reinforces its direct effect.
Proposition 3. The optimal majority rule ra* (10) increases in the project's value a and the club's enforcement capacity r, but decreases in ex post heterogeneity h.
The proof follows directly by comparing (9) and (2). In a slightly different political model, the majority rule might be bounded below by one-half in order to prevent cycles. The simple majority rule will then be second best for a wide range of parameters.
Proposition 3 has clear normative policy implications for the optimal majority rules. If the club's enforcement capacity r is large, then the majority rule should be larger, somewhat substi tuting for the poor minority protection. of countries' investments, should be decided by a smaller majority rule. Interestingly, the common market in the EU was the first area where qualified majority voting was applied. According to the Single European Act, environmental issues, for example, can be decided by a qualified majority accord ing to Article 100a, or by unanimity according to Article 130s. The latter applies to environmental issues in general, while the first applies to issues related to the common market. Environmental policies are then likely to have spillover effects through trade in addition to cross-border pollution.
IV.B. Heterogeneity in Size
In the basic model, all members were identical at the invest ment stage. For most applications, however, it is crucial to rec ognize that the members vary in size. In the European Union, for example, political debates quite often separate large (e.g., Ger many and France) from small (e.g., Belgium and Denmark) na tions. While the size of a small member is normalized to one, suppose a fraction k of all members to be of size z > 1. The total population is thus P = 1 -k + kz. To simplify, assume that the following per capita measures are independent on size: the value of the project, reservation utility, and cost of investment. That the reservation utility is the same per capita indicates that the per capita benefit from continuing cooperation is the same for all, or that a member failing to implement an approved project faces a fine proportional to its size. In this subsection and the next, I
simplify by assuming that 6 is known. If the project is implemented, the total utility of a large member is u\ = zvt -tt (its per capita utility isvt ? ttlz). Should it become a minority member, a large member's per capita utility becomes ? r, implying that the tax must be proportional to its size: tt = z(vt + r). Should it instead become a majority member, a large member negotiates with one voice like small members, and ends up with the same utility uM, implying that tt ? zvt -uM. This follows from the Nash Bargaining Solution, and it sug gests that a large country has a lower per capita bargaining power. This is actually a well-known feature: for example, Wal lace [1989, p. 202] reports on the European Union that small par ties often do disproportionately well out of coalition bargaining.13 Whom will the initiator select as majority members? Con sider, first, the one-member-one-vote principle. The majority rule then requires that the number of members who approve must be sufficiently large. If ttx and ttz denote the mass of small and large members that approve the project, respectively, this condition can be written as (13) TTi + TT^ra.
The cost of inviting a large member to the coalition, instead of expropriating it as a minority member, is uM + zr. The cost of inviting a small member, by contrast, is only uM + r. Hence, with equal voting weights, small members will be strictly preferred as coalition partners, as it is more beneficial to expropriate the large members. If ra < 1 ? k, the initiator does not need to include any large members in her coalition, and large members lack incen tives to invest as they cannot gain political power in any case. If ra > 1 ? k, the initiator will include all small members in her coalition, and small members lack incentives to invest as they are certain of gaining political power.
Consider, next, giving large members proportionally more voting power (the one-share-one-vote principle). The majority requirement is then that the population of the members who approve, relative to the total population, must be sufficiently large:
(14) (irx + zirz)/P > mP.
The alternative to inviting one large member is then to invite z small members, which costs ziuM + r). Thus, large members are strictly preferred as coalition partners, as it is cheaper to nego tiate with one large member instead of z small. If mP < k/P, small members do not invest as they can never gain political power. If mP > kIP, large members do not need to invest as they always will be included in the majority coalition. Fortunately, there are two ways out of this dilemma. The first is to make the initiator indifferent between inviting a small and a large member that both value the project highly. While small members still have one vote, suppose that a large member has w votes. The initiator is indifferent if the cost of including one large member is the same as the cost of inviting w small mem bers: uM + zr = w(uM 4-r). Thus, w should be a weighted average of the principle one-member-one-vote, and the alterna tive proportionality (one-share-one-vote) principle:
(15) w = zrl(uM + r) 4-uMl(uM 4-r).
Only under such weights do all members have incentives to invest. If the enforcement capacity r increases, or uM decreases (for example, because the remaining projects become less valu able), the weights should be more proportional to size.14 The second solution is to force the initiator to include both small and large members in the coalition. This can be ensured by using the double majority rule system combining (13) and (14), if m and mP are set such that both conditions bind in equilibrium.
This requires that (16) m < mPP < mz.
Moreover, for small and large members to face the same chance of becoming majority members, it is required that mP ? m.
Proposition 5. To ensure that both small and large members have incentives to invest, (i) the voting weights (15) should be regressive in size; or (ii) a double majority rule system should satisfy (16).
(iii) For small and large members to face the same prospects of political power, m = mP.
14. 
The European Union is indeed using regressive voting weights currently,15 while the United States is using a double majority system where both the House and the Senate must approve policies. The European Convention suggested using a double majority rule system as well, setting ra = 0.5 and mP = 0.6, thus favoring large countries. Interestingly, the Irish presi dency of the EU recently recommended that ra = mP = 0.55, though the present text states that ra = 0.55 and mP = 0.65. A problem with the double majority rule system is that countries of intermediate size will be least preferred as coalition partners.
They will therefore not have an incentive to invest and will be worse off. This might explain why the medium-sized countries in the EU (Spain and Poland) have strongly opposed the proposed double majority system.16
15. Actually, the existing system is much more complex than weighted votes. For a decision to be made, there are requirements for the number of (weighted) votes, the number of countries, and the associated size of the population. Let individual values be given by At the legislative stage, the majority coalition will, as above, offer the minority their reservation utility only, share the total surplus equally and implement only good projects. This coalition consists of the m members most in favor of the project: M = {i G Avi ? vmS f?r some vm.17 If the project turns out to be good, _'s probability of obtaining political power is which is smaller the larger is z. The reason is that a majority member does not receive a payoff which is proportional to its size. An earlier version of this paper discussed alternative legislative rules, and showed how all members would have first-best incentives to invest if a member's probability to be represented politi cally were proportional to its size. However, if the number of members n was finite, then the holdup problem would not be complete as each member could expect IIn of its investments.
Large members could then have larger incentives to invest.
17. vm is implicitly defined by the requirement that the mass of agents i subject to vt > vm must equal m:
1 1 if (a; + xf + ft/2 -vjlh > 1 J As previously, i's problem on day 1 is given by (7), where (de) and (pp) are replaced by (de') and (pp'). If ft is large enough, the solution to this problem can be characterized as follows. Member i invests x only if _'s initial value at is in the inter mediate interval [aA,aB] . If fs at is lower than aA, i does not find it worthwhile to invest to have a chance to become a majority member at the legislative stage. In any case, her chances will be quite small. Having surrendered all chances of political power, i has no incentive to invest since the majority will expropriate her entire surplus.
If at > aB, i is certain of becoming a majority member even if. does not invest as much as x. An investment of vm ~~ ai + ^/2 is sufficient to ensure that i will become a majority member, even if j should be hit by a negative shock et. The larger is ah the less i needs to invest to guarantee political power. If at = ac, i does not need to invest at all: it is certain that / is a majority member anyway. For at ^ ac, therefore, i does not invest. This is not a very desirable situation. The first-best implies that all members should invest until the marginal cost equals the marginal social value. I will now show that these problems can, in principle, be solved using the same instruments as when the members are of different size. The problem above is that members with large (small) ats are too (un)attractive as coalition partners.
But as discovered in the previous section, attractiveness can be modified by voting power. By giving more (less) voting power wi to a member with small (large) ai9 all members find it worthwhile and necessary to invest in order to gain political power. Indeed, the optimal weights can be char acterized as follows:
(17) wt = (7 -\at)K9 for any k > 0, where 7 = iv + r)(l -X)/ra + ftXra/2. Proposition 7. By giving more voting power to members that are initially badly prepared (17), all members invest optimally.
Proof of Proposition 7. With the transaction costs introduced in Section II, the per capita surplus of the majority is, from (6) is almost the same as in Sections II-IV, only the legislative game is different. Now, each policy proposal can only specify whether the project is to be implemented; all transfers are bound to be zero. If the initiator loses from the project, she would prefer a coalition of other losers to ensure that the project is not proposed and the vote will never take place. Assume, however, that at least one alternative can be suggested by the other mem bers (citizen initiative). Then, a member who gains from the project proposes to implement it, and the final vote will be deci sive. With these simple changes, the main results of the paper change dramatically.
Proposition
8. Suppose that side payments are unavailable.
(i) The ex post selection of projects hinges on the majority rule: a project is more likely to be implemented the smaller is m.
(ii) Whatever is the majority rule, incentives are first-best, unless there are externalities.
(iii) If preferences are symmetrically distributed, the simple majority rule is optimal.
Proof of Proposition 8. Assume that vt > ?r V. (otherwise, the status quo will remain). As before, projects should be under taken if 0 > ? x and optimal investment jc* is given by (2). The project will actually be approved if the fraction of is whose ut > 0 is larger than m. If the (at 4-et)s are distributed according to the cdf G, independent of i's size,18 this condition can be written as only the first, direct, effect of the investments affects Vs utility. Bargaining power cannot be exploited, and political power has no return. Investments are then optimal for any majority rule, size, and initial conditions. Externalities, however, cannot be internalized.
18. Voting weights with respect to size is then unimportant, since both small and large countries will have the same distribution of values (if they make the same investments).
Moreover, without side payments, the Coase Theorem does not suggest that the selection of projects is optimal. The winners cannot compensate the losers, so the selection of projects will hinge on the majority rule. Thus, the majority rule should be chosen in order to induce the right selection of projects. When preferences are symmet rically distributed, winners win as much as losers lose, and requir ing the former group to be larger than the latter makes ra = V2
optimal. This resembles May's [1952] Theorem. When side payments are not possible, the result justifies the emphasis on the selection of projects by the earlier literature, e.g., Rousseau
[1762], Buchanan and Tullock [1962] , and Aghion and Bolton [2003] . As shown by the latter contribution, the selection also depends on the majority rule if side payments exist, as long as there are substantial transaction costs. Then, the optimal majority rule is likely to depend on the form and size of these vestments would gradually approach (instead of jumping to) zero as m ?? 1, (ii) the optimal majority rule would always be interior (<1), and (iii) the investment, as a function of the initial condition at ( Figure II) , would be bell-shaped.
Another simplifying assumption was to let the members be a continuum. With a finite number n of members, a large number of configurations for the e^s could materialize, but investigating them would illuminate little. One difference, however, would be that the holdup problem would not be as severe as above, since each member could expect IIn of the value it created. But as n ?? oo, IIn decreases, and the optimal majority rule should decrease to prevent underinvestment.
Note that this is in line with the EU's evolution: as the number of members grows, the majority rule decreases. Moreover, the holdup problem would affect large countries less, as they constitute a larger fraction of the total population. This could mitigate the large countries' underinvest ment problem, mentioned in subsection IV.B. Incentives to do so will depend on the majority rule, and this should be set such that incentives are optimal. This context raises new questions, besides those investigated in this paper.
For example, since the preferred majority rule will depend on the owner's risk aversion, the chosen majority rule will affect equi librium ownership, not only incentives.
VII. Conclusion
Motivated by the seminal debate over Europe's future con stitution, this paper takes a new look on how to make collective decisions in general, and how to choose majority rules in par ticular. While the earlier literature takes individual values of the
